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The Progressive Era Origins of the
National Security Act
Mark R. Shulman*
Perhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to
be charged to provisions against danger; real or pretended, from
abroad.

-James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, May 1798'
I.

Introduction to "National Security"

The National Security Act of 19472 and its successors drew the
blueprint of the Cold War domestic political order. This regime
centralized control of the military services-the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, and a newly separate Air Force-in a single
It created a new professional
executive branch department.
organization to collect and analyze foreign intelligence, the Central
Intelligence Agency. And at the center of this new national
security apparatus, a National Security Council would eventually
establish foreign policy by coordinating intelligence and directing
military and para-military forces, as well as supervising a National
Security Resources Board. The national security state would build
a highway network crisscrossing the continent to facilitate the
movement of troops and supplies in case of war. In the cause of
national security, the armed forces, the intelligence apparatus,
national resources, and even domestic transportation were drawn

* Associate at Debevoise & Plimpton and Lecturer in Law, Columbia
University, School of Law. B.A. Yale, 1985; M.St. Oxford, 1986; Ph.D. University
of California, Berkeley, (history) 1990; J.D. Columbia University, 1999. The
author is indebted to Barbara Black, Robert A. Ferguson, Keith R. Johnson,
Edward Rhodes, and David Stebenne for their comments on various drafts of this
article. The author invites all comments to be sent to <shulman@aya.yale.edu>. ©
1999 Mark R. Shulman.
1. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), reprinted
in JAMES MORTON SMITH, THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826 1048 (2d ed. 1995).

2. See National Security Act, ch. 343, title § 101, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 402 (1994)).
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into the burgeoning federal government's control and coordination
within a few short years at the start of the Cold War. For such swift
and decisive changes, Congress drew on a plan sketched for an
earlier crisis, nearly a generation before.
This remarkable and unprecedented expansion of state power
and its centralization in the executive branch has been explained in
many ways. Yet the story would not be complete without an
examination of its early origins in the Progressive era, specifically in
the ideology, agenda, and activities of the National Security League
(NSL). The NSL was a public service organization founded in 1914
to lobby for increased and improved preparation for America's
defense from enemies at home and abroad. This article examines
the NSL's history and argues that the measures that formed the
basis of the Cold War national security regime had been proposed
long before the National Security Act of 1947. The national
security state was built from blueprints drawn by the leaders of the
NSL during the First World War.
The term "national security" is somewhat ambiguous3 but
appears traditionally to have at least three connotations: a set of
policies, an ideology, and an outcome. To these three, this article
contributes a fourth meaning: national security as the political
institutionalization of an idea. Leading scholars have implied that
the national security state sprang-like Pallas Athena-fullyformed in 1947 from the forehead of the Eightieth Congress.
Historian Ernest May notes that presidents have used such words as
"safety" and "securing" but claims that the actual term "national
security" was not used with any frequency until after the Second
World War.' Before then, May contends, the words "national" and
"security" were not intentionally used together-and certainly not
with the same intent as one would use them today.5 Likewise,
Harold Koh dates the first use of the phrase to the post-war period.
Koh writes that "the term 'national security' was not officially
coined until the Cold War."6

3. See ARNOLD WOLFERS, DISCORD AND COLLABORATION 147 (1962) (the
original title was "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol").
4. See Ernest R. May, National Security in American History, in RETHINKING
AMERICA'S SECURITY: BEYOND COLD WAR TO NEW WORLD ORDER 95 (Graham
Allison & Gregory F. Treverton, eds., 1991).
5. See id. at 95-103.
6. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 67, 74
(1990) Nonetheless, Koh provides an important framework from understanding
the Cold War national security constitution. For Koh's perspective on the origins,
see id. at 54-56.
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And yet Yale undergraduates of the 1790s were debating the
question, "Does the National Security depend on fostering
Domestic Industries?., 7 A century and a quarter later, a historian
used the phrase precisely as we would today to rebut the
contemporary accusation that Thomas Jefferson was a spineless
pacifist: "Likewise the lessons of two wars with the mother-country
had convinced many thinking men that industrial independence was
a necessary adjunct of political independence; and even Thomas
Jefferson, disinclined as he was to extend the functions of
government, had come to believe that public aid of home
manufactures might be required for nationalsecurity."8 The phrase
has been used since the early days of the republic. Moreover, as we
shall see, it was common parlance during World War I. But first
this article examines what it signifies.
First among its meanings, national security denotes a set of
policies that encompass domestic security and defense against
external threats. As "defense plus," it bolsters the traditional
notion of defense: "Guarding or protecting from attack; resistance
from attack; warding off of injury; protection. (The chief current
sense)."9 In lieu of "defense" one finds "security": "The condition
of being protected from or not exposed to danger: safety" or
"Freedom from care anxiety or apprehension; a feeling of safety or
freedom from or absence of danger."" ° Where "defense" connotes
sufficiency, "security" implies invulnerability. The addition of
"national" further expands the terms' scope while defining its
significance and application. Of the varieties of defense or security,
that of a "nation" seems far more expansive than merely protecting
a country's borders or even its interests. In its modern sense,
"nation" implies not only boundaries and the machinery of the
state, but also a people and a shared set of values. So national
security is a broadly encompassing notion of defense against
enemies foreign and domestic.
Second, national security signifies an ideology based on
"ordered liberty."
Justice Benjamin Cardozo introduced that
phrase to describe the condition that fundamental rights seek to
7. The Yale debate is cited in WALT W. ROsTOW, How IT ALL BEGAN:
ORIGINS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY 191 (1975).
8. Victor S. Clark, The Influence of Manufactures Upon Political Sentiment in
the United States From 1820 to 1860, 22 AM. HIsT. REv. 58 (1916) (based on a paper
presented to the American Historical Association annual meeting in Washington,
Dec. 28, 1915) (emphasis added).
9. THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1982
reprint).
10. Id.
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protect. His Palko opinion articulated the selective adoption
doctrine, which tests the fundamental nature of a right by asking if
it is necessary for "the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty."'" Cardozo neither defines that term explicitly nor indicates
whether the emphasis should fall on "order" or "liberty." This
article assumes that liberty pertains to the individual, and order to
the state-two impulses forever in tension. As such, "ordered
liberty" signals the tension that appears when someone wants to
strengthen the state at the expense of other individuals' freedom to
act as they please.
Relying on modern notions of efficiency, duty, power, and
order, national security implies the impulse to order and embodies
an ideology that descends from Alexander Hamilton. The first
Secretary of the Treasury based his vision for the American
republic on a strong central government capable of encouraging
manufacturing and trade. Together, Americans would strive to
build the nation's strength through industry, economy, and order."
To protect far-flung interests and preserve domestic order,
Hamilton's vision encompassed a strong navy capable of blue-water
operations and a well-drilled army capable of providing for the
common defense at home and abroad. A blue-water fleet was
designed to fight on open seas, thereby taking battle away from the
coastal defenses. Such a fleet, in combination with a professional
army, would enable the United States to project power abroad.
Jefferson, the first Secretary of State was constantly pitted
against Hamilton, and their visions have contended ever since.
Thomas Jefferson's alternative grand strategy required only
defending port cities with a small navy of coastal vessels combined
with well-placed fortresses. Jefferson's army was a citizen militia of
free men dedicated to protecting their homes. The followers of
Thomas Jefferson have long opposed Hamiltonian notions; they
perceived the strength and moral integrity of the nation as derived
from close ties to its agrarian, rural roots; they supported a
minimalist government-one that would police and protect people
and property while allowing for the greatest release of creative
energy."
As an ideology, national security seeks to replace
11. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
12. See, e.g., Hamilton's Report on Manufactures (1791). Hamilton "hoped to
change an essentially agricultural nation into one with a complex, self-sufficient
economy." JOHN A. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION 155 (7th ed., 1991); see also
RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AMERICAN 93-99 (1999).
13. Mark Shulman, Institutionalizing A Political Idea: Navalism and the
Emergence of American Sea Power, in THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT:

2000]

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Jeffersonian notions of defense with Hamilton's security of
interests. Isaiah Berlin characterized these diverging impulses as
"negative liberty, which the individual must be allowed to enjoy
without interference" and positive liberty, "which is an expression
of some idea of what is good for both oneself and others."14
National security implicitly argues that negative liberty is
dangerously weak and myopic. Only through the ordering of
society's resources for a common good can a great republic fulfill its
destiny.
In the Progressive era, Theodore Roosevelt embodied this
Neo-Hamiltonian impulse to order society. 5
Historian John
Morton Blum makes a telling observation in his chapter on the
"Uses of Power" in his erudite biographical sketch, The Republican
Roosevelt. To explain this, Blum first cites Lionel Trilling's
assertion that "the word happiness stands at the very center" of
liberal thought.16 He then notes that this was not so for the twentysixth president.
It is a word which Theodore Roosevelt used rarely when
speaking of himself and never when referring to other people.
This was not an accident. Roosevelt concerned himself not with
happiness but with hard work, duty, power, order. These
conditions he valued not as prereluisites for some ultimate
happiness but as ends in themselves.
Blum goes on to observe that "Roosevelt had a good deal of
difficulty in defining his beliefs, but manifestly he believed in power
and in order. With power he sought to impose order; only with
order, he contended, could there be morality."'1 8
IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERESTS 82 (Peter Trubowitz et. al. eds., 1999); see also
SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 270 (1964) ("The Neo-

Hamiltonians did not fall into the liberal tradition of Jefferson, [Andrew] Jackson,
[Herbert] Spencer, and [Woodrow] Wilson....").
14. Steven Marcus, Both Fox and Hedgehog, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, at 7
(citing Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty); see also LIONEL TRILLING, THE
LIBERAL IMAGINATION xii (1950).
15. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at 270 ("a group of statesmen and publicists
which might be labeled Neo-Hamiltonian. The outstanding individuals in this group
were Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Albert J. Beveridge,
A.T. Mahan, Herbert Croly, Leonard Wood, Henry Adams, and Brooks Adams.
The common bond among these diverse personalities was an outlook on politics
which transcended the usual American categories.").
16. JOHN MORTON BLUM, THE REPUBLICAN ROOSEVELT 106-07 (1954) (citing
TRILLING, supra note 14, at xii).

17. Id.; see also

RICHARD M. ABRAMS, CONSERVATISM IN THE PROGRESSIVE

ERA (1964).

18.

BLUM, supra note 16, at 106-07.
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Much like the philosophy that underlay the naval expansion
Roosevelt helped spawn in a previous generation,'9 the agenda of
the National Security League was far more concerned with these
goals than with happiness. However, where navalism had the
limited immediate political aim of creating a blue-water fleet, the
NSL sought to re-order American civil society on a grand scale. As
one of their own commented, the NSL's leaders intended to make
the American people "disciplined to authority and trained to
look... [for leadership in] a superior class."2 ° In such a country,
there would be "no more strikes, no surly revolt against authority
and no popular discontent.",2'
As political scientist Samuel
Huntington said of the Neo-Hamiltonians, "[t]hey shared with the
military a stress on loyalty, duty, responsibility, and subordination
of the self to the requirements of the nation. [Renowned writer and
political scion] Brooks Adams went so far as to suggest openly that
America would do well to substitute the values of West Point for
the values of Wall Street."'22 Men such as these created the
discourse of national security.
Third, national security frequently signifies an outcome of
political decisions, resources, and policies designed to shape a world
in which the interests of a nation are protected and promoted. It is
what a state enjoys as long as those plans and preparations succeed.
"National security.., implies protection, through a variety of
means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which
could threaten the fundamental values and the vitality of the
state." 23 Moreover, it is usually a dynamic outcome, because the
game continues until it is lost. It is never finally achieved and thus
retains an aspirational element.
Fourth and finally, this article argues that national security
represents the political institutionalization of an idea first
developed by the National Security League for the political
19.

See

MARK

RUSSELL

SHULMAN,

NAVALISM

AND

THE EMERGENCE OF

AMERICAN SEA POWER, 1882-1893 (1995). William Leuchtenberg also links navalism

and militarism with Progressivism's belief in a strong central government. See
William Leuchtenberg, Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement
and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916, MISS. VALLEY HIsT. REv. (J. AM. HIST.)
34 (1952); see also ROBERT H. WIEBE, SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967); SEAN
CASHMAN, AMERICA IN THE GILDED AGE (1988).
20. Robert D. Ward, The Origins and Activities of the NationalSecurity League,
1914-1918, MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. (J. OF AM. HIST.) 51, 61 (1960) (citing Amos
Pinchot, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1917).
21. Id.
22. HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at 272.
23. AMos A. JORDAN, ET AL, AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND
PROCESS 3 (4th ed. 1993) (1981).
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community of the Progressive era United States.
The NSL
formulated the concept eventually embodied in the national
security state of the early Cold War era. Huntington describes the
process by which ideas become institutionalized:
Political community in a complex society thus depends upon the
strength of the political organizations and procedures in the
society. That strength, in turn, depends upon the scope of
support for the organizations and procedures and their level of
institutionalization. Scope refers simply to the extent to which
the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in
the society. If only a small upper-class group belongs to political
organizations and behaves in terms of a set of procedures, the
scope is limited. If, on the other hand, a large segment of the
population is politically organized and follows the political
procedures, the scope is broad. Institutions are stable, valued,
recurring patterns of behavior.... Institutionalization is the
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value
and stability. The level of institutionalization of any political
system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity,
autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures.24
The NSL shaped the idea of national security and began the process
of institutionalizing it. The idea originated in "a small upper-class
group" but one that implicitly understood that the key to political
change in a democracy is the institutionalization of its ideas through
law. While these efforts seemed barren in the Progressive era, they
eventually bore fruit in the decade following World War II. In this
sense, the National Security League of the World War I era framed
the discourse of national security for the Cold War and today.
Where the League's leaders failed to institutionalize their political
and social agenda in the Progressive era, the national security state
that emerged from the shadow of World War II achieved precisely
that.
II.

The Rise of The National Security League

In August 1914, Europe erupted in a war that quickly spread to
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The British and German
navies-long rivals-opened global operations against each other.

24.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON,

POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING

SOCIETIES

12

(1968).
25. See generally, PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE OF ANGLO-GERMAN
ANTAGONISM, 1860-1914 (1980) [hereinafter ANGLO-GERMAN ANTAGONISM]; see
also PAUL M. KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF BRITISH NAVAL MASTERY (1976).
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The British slapped a brutal embargo on the Central Powers, which
retaliated with a series of measures that eventually included
unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic. Those sanctions
threatened to sever the lifelines of all trading states. The United
States was the wealthiest nation in the world but was increasingly
reliant upon trade for its economic vitality.26 Many reasonable U.S.
citizens fretted that its military capabilities would prove inadequate
in the face of German aggression." While the U.S. Navy had
recently become the third largest in the world, America's army
remained minuscule and poorly equipped by Continental
standards.n Acting from these concerns, many Americans started
to clamor for war preparation and even for intervention to forestall
the possibility that the United States could be cut off from its
trading partners or eventually invaded.29
In the months after August 1914, President Woodrow Wilson
tried to maintain America's precarious neutrality in face of
embargoes, torpedoed ships, and conflicting popular sympathies.
In April 1917, following the resumption of unrestricted U-boat
warfare and the revelation of a German conspiracy to open a front
on the Mexican-American border, President Wilson finally asked
Congress to declare war. In the year and half that followed, four
million Americans mobilized. Two million crossed the Atlantic to
join the Associated Powers on the western front. These troops
provided the might that tipped the balance and brought the conflict
to an end with the Armistice of November 11, 1918.
In December 1914, in a climate of fear and anger that
frequently veered into panic, Wall Street lawyer Solomon
Stanwood Menken established the National Security League as a
non-partisan public service organization to lobby for enhanced
American preparedness to protect against being dragged into the
Great War or-should that fail-to win it.' While other patriotic
26.

For comparative figures on wealth in 1914, see PAUL M.

AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS

243 (1987) [hereinafter

KENNEDY, THE RISE
GREAT POWERS].

27. See ALLAN R. MILLETT & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE
338-339 (2d ed. 1994).
28. See KENNEDY, GREAT POWERS, supra note 26, at 247-48. Note also
Kennedy's evaluation of the strategic situation: "The United States was immensely
secure."
29. See MILLETr & MASLOWSKI, supra note 27, at 338 ("American
internationalists.., formed a complex network of preparedness lobbies and began
propaganda programs in order to build support for increased military spending.").
30. Much of the information on the NSL in this article is based on U.S. House of
Representatives, Hearing Before a Special Committee of the House of
Representatives, Sixty-Fifth Congress, Third Session on H. Res. 469 and H. Res. 476
To Investigate and Make Report as to the Officers, Membership, FinancialSupport,
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groups coalesced around sympathies for either side in the war or a

specific program (such as pro-German or British, for universal
military training or pacifism), the NSL was organized around a new
theory of defense.3" Historian John Chambers credits the creation
of the organization to Rep. Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts,

a son-in-law of Henry Cabot Lodge. He sees Menken as a
"nominal head" and reports that former Secretary of War Elihu
Root privately referred to him as a "good-natured chuckle-head."32
No doubt the influence of Gardner, Root and other wise men was

considerable when they applied it, but they did not create the
organization so much as provide prestigious names, speeches, and
Expenditures, General Character,Activities, and Purposes of the National Security
League, A Corporationof New York, and of any Associated Organizations,65 Cong.
(1918) [hereinafter HearingBefore].
31. See JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, To RAISE AN ARMY: THE DRAFT
COMES TO MODERN AMERICA 81 (1987). The historical literature on the NSL is
scant and sometimes surprising. See Ward, supra note 20, a tentative but competent
study; GEORGE T. BLAKELY, HISTORIANS ON THE HOMEFRONT: AMERICAN
PROPAGANDA FOR THE GREAT WAR (1970), a more polemical work that seems to
argue that the historians and other propagandists were acting immorally or at least
hypocritically by using their professional skills to support the war effort; DAVID
KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 31
(1980), an invaluable book for many more reasons than its few comments on the
NSL; and JOHN CARVER EDWARDS, PATRIOTS IN PINSTRIPE: MEN OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY LEAGUE (1982), an extensive treatment of some of the NSL's personalities
and programs, which argues that the League was not particularly influential in its
day. Allan R. Millett's vast biography of subsequent League president Robert Lee
Bullard mentions the NSL only briefly. See ALLAN R. MILLETT, THE GENERAL:
ROBERT LEE BULLARD AND OFFICERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, 1881-1925
(1975).
For more on preparedness in general, see JOHN PATRICK FINNEGAN, AGAINST
THE SPECTER OF A DRAGON: THE CAMPAIGN FOR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, 19141917 (1974) and MICHAEL PEARLMAN, To MAKE DEMOCRACY SAFE FOR
AMERICA: PATRICIANS AND PREPAREDNESS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1984). The
former work is a straightforward account of the organizations and individuals that
comprised the campaign and closes in 1917. For all the strengths of the latter
book, Pearlman intentionally emphasizes the social reform aspects of the
preparedness movement while acknowledging the defense roles as critical to its
platform. He paints a picture of a movement in which some of the leaders aspired
mostly to make the republic safe for elites. This work also includes several highly
idiosyncratic observations about capitalism and communism as well as too many
factual mistakes to make it a completely credible source. I do not know of any
work that refers to the naming of the League.
Primary sources for the League have been scattered or destroyed. Bullard
destroyed many of them in the 1930's and early 1940's, apparently for lack of
storage space and a belief that the League had already become insignificant. See
Robert Lee Bullard, Robert Lee Bullard Papers (unpublished materials on file
with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division). This article has been built
upon the foundations of the secondary works as well as the Congressional reports
and personal collections cited throughout.
32. CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 81, 302 n.19.
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sometimes access to financial resources. From 1914 until 1918,
Menken gave the NSL the initial drive and daily leadership that
continuously shaped both the organization and the public's
perceptions of its significance. Immediately after the war, Menken
lost control of the League after a U.S. House of Representatives
special sub-committee concluded that it had made improper
contributions to political campaigns.33 At that point, the League
wandered off of the path it had followed for four years.
Menken and his colleagues built the NSL on a platform that
integrated a strong, almost aggressive defense policy with a panoply
of domestic security measures.
For several years the NSL
developed these notions and worked to institutionalize them
through political and educational means. It was led by the
generation's elite-bankers, lawyers, business leaders, and
statesman. Within months, the League claimed tens of thousands
of followers across the land. To institutionalize its platform, the
League's leaders organized countless rallies, published pamphlets,
engineered education programs, and even shaped political
campaigns. By 1918, its national security agenda had become part
of the American political dialogue.
A. Origins of the League: 1914-1915
Menken had been in Europe on business at the outbreak of
war. He had witnessed French mobilization in July and then the
chaos of London in August. He observed the financial and
domestic problems that arose in countries that had been
anticipating war for years.Y3 Watching a rancorous debate in the
House of Commons, Menken resolved to do everything possible to
minimize the danger of chaos in his own country. He returned to
New York determined to establish an organization that would help
the government prepare for war or preferably, prevent of it. The
New York Tribune happily reported the establishment of such a
group:
Why should we not defend ourselves? The National Security
League is the expression of a growing conviction the country
over. That conviction abates not one jot from our resolve for
peace, for our national aversion to militarism and all its works.
33. This episode will be discussed infra.
34. For the role of arms races and the coming of war in Europe, see KENNEDY,
ANGLO-GERMAN ANTAGONISM, supra note 25, DAVID HERRMANN, THE ARMING
OF EUROPE AND THE MAKING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1984).

(1996), and

JAMES JOLL,
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It postulates our national duty to labor for disarmament and an
international agreement establishing a world peace, if such a
plan can be devised by the mind of man. But it insists, in the
meantime, upon a little plain, common sense and precaution. It
insists that we shall not now cast aside all weapons because we
hope some day to make their use impossible.35
Menken turned for support first to publishing giant George H.
Putnam. Together, Menken and Putnam set out to establish a
nonpartisan group of leading citizens who could impartially help
guide public opinion to a sensible or "scientific" understanding of
the war and the relation of the United States to it. This reliance
upon so-called experts was to remain a cornerstone of the national
security agenda-one heavily influenced by Progressive era notions
of expertise and professionalism.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign policy
expertise was divided among three disparate groups. First were the
career diplomats in the embassies and consulates along with a small
coterie of civil servants working in the old State, War and Navy
office building. Second were the few statesmen who served in
government only as an adjunct to their "real" careers. In his
typically idiosyncratic way of referring to himself in the third
person, Henry Adams compared these statesmen to the career
officers:
With [Secretary of State John] Hay's politics, at home or
abroad, Adams had nothing whatever to do. Hay belonged to
the New York school, like [iron-monger and politician] Abram
Hewitt, [leader of the bar, and former Attorney General and
Secretary of State William] Evarts, [industrialist and former
Secretary of Navy] W. C. Whitney, [lawyer and former
Governor of New York] Samuel J. Tilden-men who played the
game for ambition or amusement, and played, as a rule, much
better than the professionals, but whose aims were considerably
larger than those of the usual player.3
35. N.Y. TRmB., Dec. 3, 1914.
36. HENRY ADAMS, 2 THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 155 (Time Inc. ed.
1964) (1918) (writing about 1898-1899). Hay had served as President Lincoln's
private secretary, as Assistant Secretary of State under Evarts (1879-81) and as
Secretary of State under Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt (1899-1905). Evarts
had been President Johnson's chief defense counsel in the Senate impeachment trial
and subsequently his Attorney General; he was Secretary of State under President
Harrison. Whitney was an industrialist and corporate lawyer who served as
Secretary of the Navy under President Cleveland. Tilden achieved his greatest
successes as the reformer who broke William "Boss" Tweed's Ring in New York
City, but he was also served a term as governor of New York and most famously lost
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Third were the professional military officers, who expounded a

variety of Neo-Hamiltonian principles about how to prepare for
and fight wars.37

These officers helped create the modern

professional military education institutions that produced virtually
all uniformed defense intellectuals in the early twentieth century:
the Naval Institute (1874); the Army Infantry and Cavalry School

(1881, later the Command and General Staff College); the Naval
War College (1884); and the Army War College (1901). Only with
the expansion of the national security apparatus after 1947 would a
critical mass of civilians also make careers as professional military

analysts in these institutions or the think tanks that emerged to
support the rapidly growing military-industrial complex.38 In 1914,

few civilians were truly expert in both foreign and military affairs.
To add instant credibility to the NSL's claim of expertise and
authority, Putnam suggested that Menken ask Joseph H. Choate to
serve as honorary president. 9 Choate was a leading lawyer who
the "Stolen Election of 1876" to Rutherford B. Hayes.
37. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at 270-88.
38. In 1994-95, the author worked in a Washington, DC think tank, the
National Strategy Information Center. In 1995-96 he served as a professor of
military history at the U.S. Air War College, founded when the independent Air
Force was created in 1947.
39. The NSL had five presidents and numerous honorary presidents. Robert
Bacon (1860-1919) served as the first president from January 1915 until May 1917,
while Menken was Executive Director. Menken (1870-1954) then served as
president until June 1918 and again from November 1921 until February 1925.
Honorary President Choate (1832-1917) was probably the nation's leading trial
lawyer and had served as Ambassador to Great Britain. Bacon, a banker and
partner at J.P. Morgan, had been Assistant Secretary of State, then briefly Secretary
after Elihu Root went to the Senate. He was then ambassador extraordinary and
plenipotentiary to France from 1909 to 1912. After the U.S. declared war, he joined
the Army Reserves and served on Pershing's American Expeditionary Force staff in
France. He was a leader of the preparedness movement and a founder of the
Plattsburg training camps. In the late 1870's, Bacon had been Theodore Roosevelt's
idol and friend at Harvard. See H.W. BRANDS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE LAST
ROMANTIC 61 (1997) ("[t]he biggest man on campus during Roosevelt's time was
Robert Bacon, who captained the football team, took top track honors, captured the
heavyweight boxing crown and pulled an oar on the crew. And he was good-looking
and congenial to boot.").
Honorary President Parker (1852-1926) had been Chief Justice of the New
York Court of Appeals before resigning to accept the Democratic nomination for
President in 1904. Unsuccessful running against Theodore Roosevelt, he returned
to law practice in New York City. Honorary President Root (1845-1937) was one
of the leading corporate lawyers and public servants of his day, serving as U.S.
Attorney for Southern District of New York, Secretary of War and of State, U.S.
Senator, ambassador, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, and chairman of the Republican National Committee; in 1912 he was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work to improve international arbitration.
Charles Lydecker (1851-1920) was a lawyer and New York State national
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had served as Ambassador to the Court of St. James's and then to
the International Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907. To
balance this Republican stalwart, he invited the Democratic
presidential candidate of 1904, Judge Alton B. Parker, to serve as
an honorary vice president. Parker agreed to serve only after the
personal intervention of Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison.
Former President William Howard Taft, on the other hand, refused
all entreaties to serve as an honorary vice president, contending
that the League would only foster militarism and undermine the
cause of international arbitration."
Taft called the League's
41
founders the "clubs and smart set.,
Balancing constituencies and expertise, Menken relied heavily
on George H. Putnam, a fascinating character who contributed
money, experience, and contacts to the organization. Son of
George P. Putnam, founder of the eponymous New York
publishing house, he was born in London while his parents were on
a business trip in 1844. Despite his relative youth, the son served
with distinction in the 176th New York Volunteers during the Civil
War, rising to the rank of major. During the Civil War, soldiers
could vote before their twenty-first birthday, so in November 1864
young Putnam cast the first of his many Republican ballots. Later
he played important roles in the reform movements of the party,
first as a Mugwump 42 and then in Roosevelt's Progressive faction.
After the Civil War he turned to the family business, not only
attending to editing and publishing but also becoming a driving
force for the development of international intellectual property law.
In these pursuits and for pleasure, he made some three score round
trips across the Atlantic, mostly to Great Britain. For his
achievements in publishing as well as his work to stem literary
piracy, the University of Oxford awarded him an honorary
guard officer who served in 1918-19. Charles D. Orth served briefly after the war.
The Congressional investigation cast Orth's role in an unfavorable light, as he was
responsible for the "loyalty" tests that initially drew its ire. He was, in short,
directly responsible for the disintegration of the League, starting with the
resignation of Root on December 7, 1918. Orth served until November 21, 1921,
at which point Menken returned.
Finally, Lt. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard served from February 1925 until he
closed the organization's doors for the last time on the first of July 1942.
40. For appointments, see EDWARDS, supranote 31, at 6-7.
41. Mark R. Shulman, Navalists, Realists, and the Defining of National Security,
1877-1947, 6 VALLEY FORGE J. 112 (1992).
42. The Mugwumps were a group of progressive Republicans who deserted the
G.O.P. presidential nominee (James G. Blaine) to vote for the reform-minded
governor of New York, Democrat Grover Cleveland, in 1884. The fragile coalition
had fallen apart by 1888.
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doctorate of law and letters. At the opening of the hostilities in
1914, Putnam's ties with Great Britain were deep, and the guns of
August rattled him to the core. By December 1914 he had already
been denouncing the German violation of Belgian neutrality and
labeling it a causus bellum for several months. Moreover, he
claimed that the "Hun's" eventual intent was to conquer the United
States.3
With such eminent leadership, the League immediately won
the support of other prominent citizens. Reporting the first NSL
meeting, the New York Sun headline noted: "Demand Inquiry into
Defenses of Nation-150 Well Known Men of Affairs Start
National Security League Movement."" The list soon included
eminent authors, historians, bankers, and lawyers.45 Within a year,
the national committee of 47 luminaries included university
presidents, financiers, and seven former cabinet secretaries, as well
as Thomas A. Edison, Theodore Roosevelt, and the governors of
fourteen states.46 While most of those from outside New York were
merely window-dressing, they did represent the best and the
brightest and the NSL's hope for broader political backing. 7
Widespread
and
prestigious
support was
crucial
for
institutionalizing their ideas. The initial organization included
three committees led by distinguished and capable citizens: former
43. For general biographical material, see the obituaries in the N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
28, 1930, LIVERPOOL POST AND MERCURY ORBIT, Feb. 28, 1930, and COMMON
SPEECH v. II, no., 5, Mar. 1930 (the newspaper of the English Speaking Union, of
which Putnam was a longtime vice president). For Putnam's notions about the
possibility of a German invasion, see the N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 2, 1914, and the
N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1914. The English Speaking League itself provides yet another
piece of the puzzle explaining the smooth transition of hegemony from Britain to the
United States. Menken was also an Anglophile and believed there ought to be some
variety of an Anglo-American naval alliance. See Hearing Before, supra note 30, at
370.
44. N.Y. SUN, Dec. 2, 1914, at 1.
45. National Security League flyer (Jan. 8, 1915) (unpublished material on file
with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart Papers). The original list
included Hart, William H. Cozzens, Frederic Coudert, Richard Harding Davis,
Charles S. Davison, Robert C. Morris, George E. Roosevelt, Herbert Saterlee, and
Edward R. Stettinius. See id.
46. See id. The university presidents were James B. Angell of the University of
Michigan and James Grier Hibben of Princeton; financiers included scions A.J.
Drexel Biddle and George Wharton Pepper of Pennsylvania; former secretaries of
Navy, Charles J. Bonaparte and George von L. Meyer; of War, Henry L. Stimson,
Jacob Dickinson and Luke Wright, of Labor and Commerce, Oscar L. Strauss, and
of State Philander C. Knox. See id.
47. See Announcement of the National Security Congress, Washington, January
20-22, (1916) (unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert
Bushnell Hart Papers).
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Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Scientific American editor J.
Bernard Walker, and Lyman Abbott, the estimable editor of The
Outlook.48 Although these men evidently shared some core belief
about preparedness and the need for universal military training,
there was no consensus about the role legal frameworks could play
in the effort to create or maintain international peace. For
example, between 1905 and 1909, Root, Bacon, and Abbott had
worked toward the creation of a permanent World Court and for
international arbitration, while Roosevelt and others believed that
force rather than arbitration or the law alone guaranteed peace and
security. While Roosevelt was opposing internationalist movements of all stripes, Root wrote to trusted Wilson aide and
confident Edward House that "At the basis of every community lies
the idea of an organization to preserve peace. Without that idea
there can be no community of
really active and controlling
49
individuals or nation.,
Within the National Security League, Solomon Stanwood
Menken was the force behind the nominal leaders. He was born in
Tennessee in 1879 and moved to New York as a youth, he attended
City College and Cornell, eventually taking an LL.B. from
Columbia Law School. Although he was descended from an old
Jewish family, young Menken converted to Christianity, started
going by the name Stanwood, and married an upper-class gentile.
He quickly became a successful corporate lawyer whose clients
48. See EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 8-9. Walker's assistants were the navalist
historian Robert W. Neeser and former Assistant Secretary of the Navy Beekman
Winthrop. See also Walker's navalist tract of earlier that year: THE UNITED STATES
NAVY: ITS PRESENT STANDING AND NEEDED INCREASE (1914). Abbott (1835-1922)
was a publisher, Congregational minister, and one-time pacifist. As editor of The
Outlook, he had been Roosevelt's only boss in the private sector when the former
president joined the magazine's staff after touring Africa and Europe in 1909 and
1910.
49. See Letter from Elihu Root to Col. Edward House (Aug. 16, 1918)
(unpublished material on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Elihu Root Papers); see also Letter from Nicholas Murray Butler to Theodore
Roosevelt (Dec. 5, 1906) (unpublished material on file with Columbia University,
Manuscripts and Rare Books Library, Nicholas Murray Butler Papers) regarding his
establishment of the American branch of the Association for International
Conciliation with a council to include Root, and Abbott among many prominent
citizens. Roosevelt's response is not available, but he won the Nobel Peace Prize
shortly thereafter and made perfectly clear to his friend Butler that the money was
going towards "industrial peace" not "international peace." Letter from Theodore
Roosevelt to Nicholas Murray Butler (Dec. 12, 1906) (unpublished material on file
with Columbia University, Manuscripts and Rare Books Library, Nicholas Murray
Butler Papers). Butler also worked with the NSL, in its efforts to spread propaganda
in Latin America. See EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 53. For the World Court efforts,
see PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 122.
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Despite his practice (or

perhaps because of it), Menken maintained a life-long ambiguity
about capitalism. He was a zealous reformer. He helped found the
city's Reform Club and supported the single tax movement led by
Henry George. ° He even ran for local New York office on a single-

tax ticket in 1896.

This movement advocated a reordering of

taxation based on one measure of wealth-land. Menken took his

compulsion for order into a myriad of passions. He even favored
creating some trusts. Through much of his adult life, he was also a
dedicated member of the Democratic Party, raising funds and
organizing city politics. It was only in 1912 that he started to
support the reform-oriented Progressives, including Roosevelt and
Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin. Even then he remained partial

to the Democratic Party, an affinity that soon caused a Republican
faction of the NSL to splinter off into its own group-the American
Defense Society.
B.

The League: 1915-1919

While the NSL established chapters around the country, its
greatest support came from residents of New York City. Between

1915 and 1919, some 94% of all contributions over $200 came from
the New York area.51 The NSL got a good part of its financial
backing from the wealthy and mighty: corporate lawyer Elihu Root,
oil titan John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Arthur C. James of Phelps Dodge,
banker J.P. Morgan, financier Jacob Schiff, and T. Coleman du
50. Much of this biographical information on Menken comes from EDWARDS,
supra note 31, at 2-3 and PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 138-139. For Henry George
and reform, see Ronald William Yanosky, Seeing the Cat: Henry George and the rise
of the Single Tax Movement, 1879-1890 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation) (on
file with the University of California, Berkeley). Henry George, author of the
highly-popular work on political economy POVERTY AND PROGRESS, led a
movement to move to a single-tax system based on the notion that all wealth was
derived from ownership of land, and consequently, the state should have the
authority and obligation to tax land tenure very heavily. In 1886's mayoral race,
George came in second behind Abram Hewitt but ahead of the Republican reform
candidate, twenty-eight year old Theodore Roosevelt. It seems that some 15,000
GOP voters defected to the Democrat Hewitt in order to thwart George. The 189697 campaign was George's second try, running on the "Democracy of Jefferson"
ticket, an anti-Tammany, anti-Bryan fusion. George died several days before the
election, apparently defusing the entire issue in New York. For the 1886 campaign,
see EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 356-57 (1979).
51. For a discussion of the contributions, see Hearing Before, supra note 30
(note especially page 883); see also CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 82, 303 n.21.
Feeding post-war revisionist attacks on the "merchants of death," the investigative
committee discovered that munitions makers like du Pont and Maxim had
contributed to the NSL's coffers.
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Pont, an heir to the chemical company. Like the majority of New
Yorkers in this era, NSL supporters and leaders had been born and
bred in many places. Menken was from Tennessee, his successor
Robert Lee Bullard was from Alabama. Honorary Presidents
Choate and Robert Bacon had been born in Massachusetts, Alton
B. Parker and Elihu Root in upstate New York. Putnam was born
in London. While most NSL leaders and supporters lived in New
York, at the time so did approximately 10% of the nation-and a
much higher percentage of those who wielded capital.
The NSL grew rapidly even after the Republicans-only
American Defense Society split off in the late summer of 1915. By
mid-1916 the NSL had some 50,000 members nationally, organized
into 155 branches in 42 states. By the end of the year, membership
had doubled, with 250 chapters and 100,000 members. Until the
Armistice nearly two years later, the numbers remained high. Few
official records remain from the League, and a complete catalogue
of its activities is nowhere to be found. Nonetheless, we do know
that it organized hundreds of rallies around the nation. Lyman
Abbott chaired the Committee on Extension, the regional branches
bureau. Harvard Professor Albert Bushnell Hart led the League's
outreach programs as educational director of the NSL's Committee
on Patriotism through Education. This section undertook the bulk
of the League's propaganda work, sending speakers, writers, and
handbooks to hundreds of thousands of Americans at meeting
halls, street corners, and open-air assemblies.53
C. The NationalSecurity Agenda
Wielding historical analogies, social Darwinist theory, and a
brand of economics particular to the era, the League's theorists
argued for a bolstered defense virtually unprecedented in the
American experience. Its leaders devised a nationalist agenda that
provided for a strong defense against enemies of the state at home
and abroad. Enemies included all those who were not "100%
American," eventually meaning not only foreign nationals,
pacifists, many immigrants, and political radicals,54 but also trade
For membership numbers, see CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 81.
See NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE, AMERICA AT WAR: A HANDBOOK OF
PATRIOTIC EDUCATION REFERENCES (Albert Bushnell Hart ed. 1918); see also
52.
53.

NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE, THE HANDBOOK OF THE WAR FOR READERS,
SPEAKERS, AND TEACHERS (Albert Bushnell Hart & Arthur 0. Lovejoy eds., 2d ed.,

1918) (1917).
54. See Diary entry of Robert Lee Bullard, Robert Lee Bullard Papers (Dec.
27, 1926) (unpublished materials on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts
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union members, Congressmen who voted against critical pieces of
legislation, and even the people of Wisconsin. To illustrate the
complexity of the NSL's agenda, it is worth introducing one of the
League's leading thinkers, historian Albert Bushnell Hart. After
that, this article will explicitly address the NSL's positions on
economics, defense, and citizenship.
1. The Historian-"The Grand Old Man of American
History," Harvard Professor Hart provided a depth of historical
understanding and cultural context that grounded the NSL in some
of the nation's finest political traditions.5 A believer in the liberty
Berlin later labeled "positive," Hart strove for several years to
ensure that the League's effort strengthened security without
endangering Jeffersonian liberty. Hart had taught W.E.B. DuBois
and was later elected a trustee of Howard University. He worked
to support the causes of Armenians and Jews abroad. Within the
League, however, he lost out to those who preferred the NeoHamiltonian vision of the strong state-one that paid less attention
to individuals' claims against the society and the state. Hart's
histories were all of the patriotic stripe that dominated the
profession in the Progressive era.
As with most of his
contemporaries,5 6 he wrote a brand of teleological history that
sought to explain and celebrate American exceptionalism and
greatness. He saw its origins in the British system and felt a great
affinity with that nation. Though he was sometimes accused of
selling out his professional perspective to the war effort, Hart
supported patriotic causes because his studies led him to believe
them right and just.

Division, Robert Lee Bullard Papers).
55. See Samuel Eliot Morison, A Memoir and Estimate of Albert Bushnell
Hart, MASS. HIST. SOC. PROC. 28-52 (1966) (unpublished material on file with
Harvard University Library). Twice a winner of the Pulitzer Prize and official
historian of Harvard University, Morison (1887-1976) had been Hart's teaching
assistant, starting in the fall of 1910.
56. And yet Hart was often alone among his white colleagues in recounting the
indignities that the dominant white American culture inflicted upon AfricanAmericans among others. Hart's support of W.E.B. DuBois is found in various
writings. After the war, Hart left his home on Harvard's history department mostly
because he did not get along with his colleague Archibald Cary Coolidge (founding
editor of Foreign Affairs). Hart moved to the new department of political science as
the Eaton Professor of Government. The NSL was not Hart's first effort at creating
an organization to promote the influence of professionals. Long after leading the
American Historical Association, Hart presided over the American Political Science
Association. He died in 1943. Much of this biographical information comes from
Morison, supra note 55, at 28-52.

2000]

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Ironically, when war broke out, several of hysterical jingoists
mislabeled Hart a friend of Prussianized Germany. Given Hart's
writings throughout this period, such accusations seem misguided at
best. Nonetheless, in December 1918 an agent in the Department
of Justice's Bureau of Investigation (precursor of the FBI) released
a list of Americans in sympathy with Germany. Hart's name was
among them.

Indeed he had studied in Germany and retained

many deep friendships with Germans. He was on the verge of
accepting a one-year visiting professorship in Berlin when war
intervened. Yet for Hart there was no contest. The British had
sewn the seeds that germinated in the United States. He viewed
their political and cultural institutions as parents or older siblings of
America's. With the help of some influential fellow Harvard
alumni (including Roosevelt and Lodge) and the NSL, he was able
to squash the spurious rumor that he was pro-German. 7 The new
Bureau's ability to blacklist subversives had limits.

In the 32 months preceding the American entry into the war,
Hart was probably the educator most prolific and influential in the
preparedness movement. Even after April 1917, Hart's rhetoric
was high and his patriotism keen. However, by that point some of
the League's leaders had turned to a more military brand of

nationalism that contravened Hart's respect for propriety, human
dignity, and positive liberty.

57. Hart's defense rushed to Washington in a flurry of letters and telegrams
from Lodge, Roosevelt, the governor of Illinois, a federal judge, J. Franklin Jameson,
Charles Lydecker, Henry West, and Joseph Choate. See Morison, supra note 55;
Albert Bushnell Hart, Trail of the German (unpublished material on file with
Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart Papers); Letter from David Starr
Jordan to Sen. Lee Slater Overman, Chair, Special Investigative Committee
(December 23, 1918) (unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library,
Albert Bushnell Hart Papers); Letter from J. Franklin Jameson to Albert Bushnell
Hart (unpublished material on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Jameson Correspondence). Hart's persecutor, Henry Bielaski, had already
encouraged a semi-official vigilantism in the creation of the American Protective
League in the spring of 1917. See KENNEDY, OVER HERE, supra note 31, at 81; see
also Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Year 18
(1918).
Lodge had
Hart had been Roosevelt's classmate at Harvard College.
graduated several years earlier; he had received one of the first history Ph.D.'s
from Harvard in 1876 as a student of Henry Adams. Lodge then spent a couple of
years teaching in the history department, departing in 1879 and creating a gap in
the department subsequently filled by Hart. See Morison supra note 55; see also
WILLIAM C. WIDENOR, HENRY CABOT LODGE AND THE SEARCH FOR AN
Widenor provides a sophisticated
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1, 11 (1980).

treatment of Lodge's views on the uses of history and the Hamilton-Jefferson
debates in chapter 1, The Attractionsand Uses of History.
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In 1918 Hart helped Menken rein in the egregious Robert
McNutt McElroy, a Princeton historian who was preaching hyperAmericanism for the NSL across the country. At the end of one of
the NSL's "Preparedness Parades," McElroy and others addressed
the University of Wisconsin's cadet regiment after it had marched
in wool uniforms through a driving rainstorm." The tent in which
McElroy spoke had inadequate acoustics. The prominent attorney,
John M. Olin, sitting twenty feet away, could not hear McElroy's
long harangue. 9 Piqued by the cadets' inattention to his ranting,
McElroy grew increasingly impatient as he spoke. He accused the
regiment and assembled faculty of treason, but there was no
response. No one could hear him. Perhaps to test if they were
listening-or possibly because he believed it-McElroy then
widened the accusation, branding as treasonous not only the state's
Chief Justice (who was in attendance but could not hear) but the
entire population of that heavily German-American state.'
McElroy's outrage signaled the beginning of the end of the
NSL's national aspirations. National press coverage labeled it an
outrageous and inflammatory organization of East Coast
xenophobes. While some NSL leaders were fanatical about their
cause, they usually tempered their fervor, couching it in mainstream
terms acceptable not only to the nominal leaders like Root and
58. The NSL started these parades in the spring of 1916, see CHAMBERS, supra
note 31, at 120.
59. See Letter from John M. Olin to Charles R. Van Hise (May 2, 1918)
(unpublished material on file with Columbia University, Columbia University
Teacher's College Manuscripts Collection).
60. The McElroy/Wisconsin flap contains fodder for several articles. See, e.g.,
John Bradley Winslow (Chief Justice, Wisconsin State Supreme Court), Charles R.
Van Hise (President of the University of Wisconsin), & E. A. Birge (Dean of the
College of Letters and Science), Report upon Statements of ProfessorRobert McNutt
McElroy and the Executive Committee of the National Security League Relating to the
University of Wisconsin (Madison: University of Wisconsin, n.d. (1918)). McElroy's
diatribe started at the Madison Agricultural Pavilion on April 6, 1918, and was
amplified in an NSL pamphlet dated April 15, 1918, the April 18, 1918 NEW YORK
TRIBUNE, and then in the CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 13, 1918. For Hart's reaction to
the ruckus, see Letter from Frederick L. Paxson to Albert Bushnell Hart (April 22,
1918) (unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert
Bushnell Hart Papers); Letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to Carl Russell Fish, (April
22, 1918) (unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert
Bushnell Hart Papers). The story is also told in EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 99-110.
For more on the anti-German-American hysteria, see DANIEL PATRICK
MOYNIHAN, SECRECY (1998).
A sociologist (and statesman), Moynihan makes
much of the role of ethnic diversity in shaping American paranoia and xenophobia
that led to the infamous Sedition (1917) and Espionage (1918) acts. See id.; see
also Mark R. Shulman, Secrecy, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. July 1999, at 100 (book
review). It was this sort of reaction that Hart unsuccessfully sought to avoid.
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Roosevelt but also to a larger cut of the general population. It was
this line of fanaticism verging on paranoia that McElroy crossed,
and that Hart strove to keep the NSL from crossing. The tendency
among some members to breach it only grew more pronounced
with the Armistice and Menken's resignation.
2. Economics-In its heyday, the League demanded that
more of the economy be centralized, in the hands of either reliable
cartels or the government. Somehow this was presumed to be
different from loathsome communism, perhaps because the desired
goals were power and efficiency, not the well-being of the less
privileged. The NSL sought to increase efficiency and security
while avoiding issues of distributional justice. To centralize the
economy, Menken advocated high tariffs and higher taxes to fund
the expanding federal government. 6' He had favored the creation
of a Federal Reserve when most professional experts did not.62 The
pursuit of order led the NSL to call for the creation of cartels to
produce and deliver certain essential goods and services. Menken
focused on three: "the milk business in New York City. We ought
to have one milk company.... [and] I think the coal business ought
I think there would be great value in
to be consolidated.
Competition between electric comconsolidating electric lines.
' 63
,
wasteful.
always
is
panies
The unrestricted right to private property provided one of the
cornerstones of the League's agenda; to some, trade unions were as
menacing as U-boats. When the Peace of Paris relieved the nation
of any plausible military threat, this right.was virtually all that
remained of the League's agenda. In the summer of 1919, the NSL
leadership appears to have decided that untrammeled property
rights formed the proper basis of American society. Still trying to
moderate the excesses of his reactionary colleagues, Hart quickly
put the League on notice. "What is the matter with the National
Security League?" he wrote Menken. 64 "I am completely at a loss
to understand some recent developments. I have written a letter of
protest against Colonel Lydecker's proposed campaign to induce
the American people to believe that the ownership of property is
the foundation of the Republic. No society, no party, no public

61. See Hearing Before, supra note 30, at 481.
62. See id. at 478.
63. Id. at 481.
64. Letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to S. Stanwood Menken (Sep. 27, 1919)
(unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell
Hart Papers).
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body could possibly stand up under that burden., 65 He repeated
this argument in a letter to Charles Orth, who was then leading the
League towards advocating an increasingly authoritarian domestic
regime. "As a matter of fact no progress can be made in this
country which does not recognize the labor unions as a form of
organization which has come to stay, which needs restriction and
common sense, but cannot be gotten rid of. ' 6 6 The League's
responses go unrecorded, but Hart was clearly unhappy with the
excesses the League had been driving toward since the Armistice.
In the end, Hart lost, the NSL fought unions on the ground that
they were "communistic., 67 Stripped of its defense rationale, the
National Security League agenda was left with anti-unionism and
anti-communism.
3. Defense-During the war, the most critical contradictions
in the NSL agenda were revealed in the debate over militarism.
While all NSL leaders believed in the benefits of military
preparedness, including increased expenditures for the army and
navy and coordination of both services at the political level, they
differed over the impact it should have on civil society. As always,
Hart voiced moderation. He described the impact that war could
have on American society and came to what might appear a
surprising conclusion. In the war, he noted,
is evidence that even a mild militarism has very unfavorable
effects upon democracy .... The joy of American living is the
right to one's own way ....
[W]e go to an excess of
freedom ....

The yellow journal pushes the right of a free press

to the point of scurrilousness. Children select their schools and
65. Id.; see also Letter from S. Stanwood Menken to Albert Bushnell Hart
(Sep. 29, 1919) (unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library,
Albert Bushnell Hart Papers); Response of Albert Bushnell Hart (Sep. 30, 1919)
(unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell
Hart Papers).
66. Letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to Charles Orth (Oct. 11, 1919)
(unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell
Hart Papers).
67. See, e.g., Diary entry of Robert Lee Bullard (Jul. 8, 1928) (unpublished
material on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Robert Lee
Bullard Papers) ("The NSL has put a recent plank on its platform, 'opposition to
government ownership or operations of railroads, telephones and other public
utilities.' I have now the duty of making it strong and of effect."); Diary entry of
Robert Lee Bullard (June 30, 1937) (unpublished material on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscripts Division, Robert Lee Bullard Papers); Diary entry of Robert
Lee Bullard (Jul. 30, 1938) (unpublished material on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscripts Division, Robert Lee Bullard Papers) ("Bitter politics
continue over New Deal policies and measures, with growing belief that these are
becoming Communistic.").
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colleges, their friends and amusements. The trade in poisonous
drugs is just now coming under regulation. Yet there is no
genuine American who does not feel that these extravagances
are to be endured, if necessary, to keep the two pearls of great
price-freedom of body from the control of another person, and
the freedom of the soul to see and to describe things as they
68
are.

This passage raises some interesting issues. First, Hart pursued
his pearls-even for unpopular causes. Among other things, he
worked strenuously to support the rights of African-Americans to
vote and to get an education.69 Second, the passage illuminates his
personal, even arbitrary, definition of excessive freedom. He
implies that actual scurrilousness would take the press beyond its
guaranteed freedom.7" The notion that children might choose their
own schools and friends would rank low on most lists of the
excesses of democracy. Advocating control of "poisonous drugs"
seems a paradoxical way to argue that democracy lets one do with
one's body what one wishes. And third, the conclusion of the
passage seems to come from nowhere:
War is the negative and denial of freedom. All modern wars
rest upon the universal legal principle that it is the right of the
state to command the service of any or all of its sons. The free
American may be, indeed ought to be, compelled to undergo
some military training.7

This argument implies a link between universal military training
and effective strategic deterrence, which seems a large leap of
argumentative faith. Hart also later claimed that universal military
training would drive down domestic crime.72

68.

Albert Bushnell Hart, The War and Democracy, in

READJUSTMENT AFTER THE WAR,

PROBLEMS

OF

15-16 (1915).

69. See Morison, supra note 55, at 47.
70. This notion was supported during the American participation in World War
I. Congress passed its now-notorious Sedition Act (1918) to limit "disloyal
utterances" in addition to the Espionage Act of 1917. These acts were contested in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (applying the "clear and present danger"
test to uphold the constitutionality of the Espionage Act), Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), and Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (applying the bad tendency test to uphold the
constitutionality of the Sedition Act); see also HARRY N. SCHREIBER, THE WILSON
ADMINISTRATION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1917-1921 (1960).
71. Hart, supra note 68, at 16.
72. See Hart's comments before the Congress for Constructive Patriotism in
Washington, D.C., Dec. 25-27, 1917; see also EDWARDS, supranote 31, at 49.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:2

If Hart was ambivalent about the impact of a preparedness
movement on American democracy, other leaders displayed fewer
doubts and greater enthusiasm. Honorary NSL Vice President
Theodore Roosevelt vigorously argued before the League's annual
meeting:
We need, more than anything else in the country, thoroughgoing
Americanism,-for unless we are Americans and nothing else,
we are not a nation at all- and thoroughgoing preparedness in
time of peace against war,-for if we are not thus prepared, we
shall remain a nation only until some more virile nation finds it
worth while to conquer us. The work of preparedness-spiritual
and material, civil, industrial, and military-and the work of
Americanization are simply the two paramount phases or
elements of the work of constructive patriotism which your
Congress has gathered to foster. There can be no real
preparedness in this country unless this country is thoroughly
Americanized; for only a patriotic people will be prepared; and
there can be no deep national feeling for America, until we are
all of us Americans through and through.73
This passage illuminates Roosevelt's Darwinian understanding of
international relations: only the fittest nation survives. Moreover,
survival depends not only on preparedness in its broadest sense
("spiritual and material, civil, industrial, and military") but also on
a nationalist socialization that brooks sympathy for no other culture
or state. Roosevelt's fervor for war soon overwhelmed his "100%
Americanism" when he schemed to go behind the back of President
Wilson to raise a division-if necessary a division of the French or
Canadian armies. Naturally, Roosevelt viewed this as pursuing an
American agenda, albeit in a non-American organization.
In
Roosevelt's world, each individual is thoroughly devoted to the
triumph of his state. Likewise, Elihu Root decried the fact that the
nation had "reached this condition of indifference and sluggish
patriotism though decadence. As we have grown rich in material
things we have grown poor in spirit. 7 4 While many other NSL
leaders no doubt shared this view, the nation of immigrants could
not.
4. Universal Military Service-Far less controversially, the
League built support for universal military training under which
73. 8 LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 1143 (Elting E. Morison ed. 1954)
(emphasis added) (quoting Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to S. Stanwood Menken
(Jan. 10, 1917)).
74. PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 145 (quoting Elihu Root, Proceedings of the

Congress of Constructive Patriotism23).
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every able man would serve some time on active duty and join in
some sort of reserve. The original NSL organization included three
committees led by distinguished and capable citizens. A founding
member of the foreign policy elite, former Secretary of War Henry
Stimson chaired the NSL's Army Committee, which advocated a
Continental-sized service." Scientific American editor and navalist
J. Bernard Walker chaired the Navy Committee, which called for
creation of the largest navy in the world. Roosevelt expressed
similar views in a letter to Henry Wise Wood.76
We must ultimately organize ourselves, socially and for the
work of peace, and for self-defense in war, with the
extraordinary efficiency that Germany has shown, thanks to the
movement begun in Germany over a century ago.... [AInd
with this end in view to secure practical preparedness for against
war by introducing some adaptation of the excellent Swiss
system of universal and obligatory military service.77
Then he laid out his agenda, one more typical of big-government
Republicans than of their relatively anti-federal Democratic rivals:
First we should at once enter upon a comprehensive plan of
naval construction, which shall at the earliest possible moment
make us the second naval power of the world. Second, we must
insist upon the publication by the Government of the plans of
the General Staff of the Army, so that the people may know
75. True to his principles, Stimson was sworn into the United States Army on
May 31, 1917. In his June 1940 commencement address at Yale, former Secretary
of War and of State Stimson renewed the call for a draft. For his troubles,
President Franklin Roosevelt asked him to return to service as Secretary of War.
See HENRY STIMSON & McGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND
WAR 91, 480-84 (1947). Huntington refers to this moment in a footnote also
because his argument is that the Neo-Hamiltonian compromise between the
military ethos and the dominant Jeffersonian liberal tradition had ended in 1920.
See HUNTINGTON, supra note 13, at 271 n.* ("Neo-Hamiltonism reemerged briefly
in 1940 and 1941 when Grenville Clark, Stimson, Robert P. Patterson, Elihu Root,
Jr., and others in the Roosevelt-Root-Wood tradition played a major role in
stimulating American rearmament and in securing the passage of the Selective
Service Act of 1940."). This article argues that the Neo-Hamiltonian impulse did
not die in 1920 and that its resurfacing in 1940 was an important harbinger of the
national security state.
76. Henry Wise Wood (1866-1939), son of New York's Civil War era
"Copperhead" Democrat mayor (Fernando Wood), was an industrialist, poet, and
political philosopher. See PEARLMAN, supranote 31, at 134-135.
77. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Wise Wood, chair of the
conference committee on national preparedness (Oct. 30, 1915) (unpublished
material on file with Columbia University, Manuscripts and Rare Books Library,
George H. Putnam Papers, Correspondence Files). Wood also served as executive
director of the NSL.
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what their military experts regard as the vital military needs of
the Republic.78

Like most of the League's members and with the exception of the
division he would command, Roosevelt supported professional
leadership of a citizen army. 9 And like most members, Roosevelt
preferred a military run by a panel of experts rather than subject to
a Congress captured by local interests.Y For all his experience as a
soldier, author, and statesman, Roosevelt would qualify as one of
the few such civilian experts.
5. 100% Americans-The NSL's 100 percent American
campaign had not waited for Congress to declare war on the
Central Powers. Socialists, hyphenated Americans, and opponents
of total mobilization for war were not "100 percent American."
Roosevelt wrote to Menken, "Citizenship must mean an undivided
loyalty to America; there can be no citizenship on the 50-50 basis;
there can be no loyalty half to American and half to Germany, or
England, or France, or Ireland, or any other country."81 Roosevelt's
strident patriotism was quickly echoed across the nation and
magnified with the entry into war. German-Americans were
abused, scorned, and sometimes lynched. Even before U.S. entry
into the war, however, they suffered. Toying with the idea of
running for President again early in 1916, Roosevelt was told of
their opposition. He remarked typically,
If the German-American vote is solid against me because of the
position I have taken, then, in my judgment, it shows that the
German-Americans are solidly against this country. I do not
believe that it is true of the vast majority of American citizens of
German birth and descent; but, if it is true, it renders it all the

i
more necessary that I should,
the sharpest ppossible
manner,
to theirindanger.
Americans
real
up
wake

78. Id.
79. See EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 46-47; PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 160.

80. For an analysis of the impact of rent-seeking local interests of Progressive
era military strategy, see Peter Trubowitz, Geography and Strategy: The Politics of

American Naval Expansion, in THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT, ch. 4,
(Trubowitz et. al., eds., 1999) (regional interests shaped the composition and thus the
strategy of the new navy that emerged in the late nineteenth century).
81. 8 THE LETrERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 73, at 1144 (quoting
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to S. Stanwood Menken (Jan. 10, 1917)). For an
reprise of these sentiments, see Hermann Hagedorn's panegyric, THE BUGLE THAT
WOKE AMERICA: THE SAGA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S LAST BATTLE FOR HIS

(1940).
82. 8 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 73, at 1016 (quoting
Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Gifford Pinchot (Feb. 8,1916)). For his decision
COUNTRY

2000]

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

In the end, Roosevelt rejected a run.
Three days before the election of 1916, Wilson announced his
own preparedness program in a speech at the Manhattan Club. He
called for speeding up naval construction and strengthening the
National Guard. Proposing only a half-hearted acceleration, this
speech failed to generate support among many Republicans - with

the notable exceptions of Stimson and Root. Roosevelt wrote to
his old friend Henry Cabot Lodge, "Root and Stimson by their

letters to the Security League have started Wilson on his tour with
their endorsement. '' 83

Even such mild measures, however, put

Wilson out in front of many of his more pacifistic Democratic
colleagues-among them former Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan, Speaker of the House James Beauchamp "Champ"
Clark, Representative Claude Kitchen, and members of the

American Union Against Militarism.'
Throughout its existence and particularly in the two and a half
years before the U.S. declaration of war, the NSL called for some

form of universal military training, believing in its strategic and
moral value. Thus the leaders and members of the NSL cultivated

manly martial vigor. Henry Wise Wood attributed the nation's
decline to a "wave of effeminacy."85

The NSL supported

not to run, see id. (May-June 1916 letters from Roosevelt); see also Letter from
Albert Bushnell Hart to Theodore Roosevelt (June, 15, 1916) (unpublished material
on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart Papers).
83. 8 THE LEITERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 73, at 1005-07
(quoting Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge (Jan. 26, 1916)).
84. See id. at 978; see also CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 114.
85. For Wood's comments, see EDWARDS, supra note 31, at 57. For some
interesting observations of the relationship between military, manliness, and the
integrity of society, see KRISTIN L. HOGANSON, FIGHTING FOR AMERICAN
MANHOOD:

How

GENDER POLITICS PROVOKED THE SPANISH-AMERICAN

AND

PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WARS (1998); Thomas Ricks, Separation Anxiety, WALL ST.
J., Jul. 27, 1995, at 1 f. And also see the relevant historical literature of this
movement, including foremost CHAMBERS, supra, note 31. For a comparison with
the British model, see some important recent works, including foremost R.J.Q.
ADAMS & PHILIP P. PIORIER, THE CONSCRIPTION CONTROVERSY IN GREAT BRITAIN,

1900-1918 (1987) which examines Lord Roberts' National Service League. The
British League was established to press for compulsory drill for boys and service for
young men. See id. at 10. The most famous soldier living in Britain, Lord Roberts
assumed the presidency of the National Service League in December 1905,
immediately granting it tremendous prestige. See id. at 11. Adams and Piorier
believe that the League took its model from the British Navy League, the Imperial
Maritime League, and the National Defense Association. See id. at 245-55 n.27.
While the League expressed concern about the possibility of the nation being
overrun in an invasion, its leaders also hoped that drill and service would promote a
distinct brand of young men and of patriotism. One of its leaders wrote in 1907 that
it was "one of the most powerful moral agencies at our command." Id. at 20. The
League had 10,000 members in 1907, 32,000 in 1909, 62,000 a year later, and some
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"compulsory military training and service, wholly under national
control, for all physically fit male citizens." ' Henry L. Stimson
wrote to Putnam:
It is needless to tell you that I am a strong believer in the
principle of universal training and service in this country, both
as a military necessity and as a highly important part of our
education for civil duties.... I do not think that we shall ever
get universal service without universal training. It is only when
people realize that when all citizens, rich and poor alike, are
equally bearing their share of the duty as well as deriving their
share of the benefit of the physical training and lessons of
discipline that go with it, that they will accept the scheme as a
part of their American citizenship."'
This type of service would have at least three unintended but
powerful secondary effects. First, the power, scope, and size of the
federal government would have to increase tremendously in order
to manage, train, and provision millions of men in uniform. New
management skills, physical infrastructures, and doctrine would be
required.'
Second, the government would have to decide who was fit.
This inevitably meant defining categories typical of Progressive era
scientific management. The definition of fitness normally included
physical characteristics such as height, strength, and number of
original teeth. The armed forces had also initiated mass use of
psychologist Alfred Binet's intelligence tests as improved by Lewis
Terman of Stanford University. The Stanford-Binet tests gained in
270,000 members by the outbreak of war. See id. at 17. This League led to a new
Ministry of National Service in August 1917. See id. I suspect that the naming of the
American National Security League owed something also to the fact that there were
already Navy and Army Leagues, giving the NSL a certain immediate familiarity and
gravitas.

Additional literature includes

PETER SIMKINS, KITCHENER'S ARMY: THE

RAISING OF THE NEW ARMY, 1914-1916 (1988), Nicoletta Gullacci, Women and the
Ideology of War: Recruitment, Propaganda, and the Mobilization of Public
Opinion in Britain, 1914-1918 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation) (on file
with the University of California, Berkeley), and NANCY BRISTOW, MAKING MEN
MORAL: SOCIAL ENGINEERING DURING THE GREAT WAR (1996).
86. Letter from Henry Stimson to George Haven Putnam (Nov. 15, 1916)
(unpublished material on file with Columbia University, Manuscripts and Rare
Books Library, George Haven Putnam Papers).
87. Id. For membership numbers, see CHAMBERS, supra note 31, at 81.
88. See KENNEDY, OVER HERE, supra note 31; EDWARD M. COFFMAN, THE
WAR TO END ALL WARS (1968) for this buildup; see also AN ADMIRAL'S YARN: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HARRIS LANING (Mark R. Shulman, et. al. eds. 1999) (detailing
the experience of undertaking the naval personnel buildup from the perspective of
the acting Chief of the Bureau of Personnel).
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popularity, and soon most of American youth had to take them
regularly. This army innovation eventually altered the way the
nation understood intelligence. Fitness came quickly also to
include some strict categories of moral suitability, triggering
campaigns to drive out religious or political dissenters, sexual
"deviants," those who frequented prostitutes, and people convicted
of crimes who
had completed their punishment-now a class called
"criminals." 9 The unfit did not include pacifists, who could be
coerced into service because national security overrode their
personal qualms. Each of the categories led to moral or reform
campaigns. Whatever personal views one may have of those who
were deemed unfit, the fact remains that the government for the
first time formally defined individual fitness for participation in a
political process.
Finally, universal military training and service would alter the
strategic dynamic not only in the western hemisphere but among
the great powers.' Again, whatever one's view of America's role in
the world, universal military training would undoubtedly alter it by
changing regional and global balances of power. Like Stimson,
most of those encouraging compulsory service believed that
additional manpower would make the nation more secure.
Moreover, they believed that the moral qualities derived from
military service would imbue a sense of honor, integrity, and duty in
America's youth and consequently in a nation whose vigor was
daily being sapped by "the love of soft-living."91 Additionally, the
League hoped to instill "100% Americanism" in a way that did not
require military drill; it promoted a plan to employ civilian
conscripts in the construction of great public works on the rationale
that it would cultivate discipline and Americanism. This plan
89. Although prostitution or "white slavery" was never politically popular within
the Progressive movement, the Army under the direction of President Wilson
undertook its eradication virtually an unprecedented move in the history of war. See
KENNEDY, OVER HERE, supra note 31, at 186-187.
Kennedy cites American
Expeditionary Forces pamphlets that asked, "How could you look the flag in the
face, if you were dirty with gonorrhea?" and encouraged avoiding any "potentially
infectious liaison." Id. This was also the era of the first mass efforts to drive
homosexuals out of the armed forces. See RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING:
LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S. MILITARY 16 (1993). For persecution of political or
religious dissenters, see KENNEDY, OVER HERE, supra note 31, at 146-167.
90. This article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive view of the
universal military training and service movement. For one important and expansive
interpretation, see CHAMBERS, supra note 31 (particularly chapter 3).
91. 8 THE LETTERS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 73, at 1144 ("softliving" is quoted from a letter of Theodore Roosevelt to S. Stanwood Menken (Jan.
10, 1917)).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:2

would also produce a national highway system to foster interstate
commerce and national unity in peacetime and speed the
movement of troops in a national emergency.'
Once Congress declared war, large-scale conscription effectively overtook the cause of universal military training, thus robbing
the NSL of the most tangible and democratic item on its agenda.
From then on, the League turned increasingly to more elitist
reforms such as increasing the power of experts to insulate decisionmaking from the electorate. The League's leaders tried to throw
themselves into supporting the draft by distributing uncounted
pamphlets and waking myriad speeches, but the government's own
propagandists were eminently successful and did not need the
NSL's help.93 Nevertheless, among the nearly two hundred NSL
pamphlets listed for the investigative subcommittee in 1918, scores
addressed military manpower issues. And the League could not
credibly complain that President Wilson was failing to fight a
"scientific war." According to a leading historian of the progressive
movement, "Like a figure out of progressive theory, the President
embarked with a handful of associates and a large retinue of expert
assistants, the specialists whose particular, scientific knowledge
would fill out his dream of world peace." 9' The League's agenda
called for increased defense expenditures as established by
"experts," rather than by a Congress subject to a variety of political
influences that the League thought inappropriate to such a critical
set of issues. It called also for multi-year budgets for military and
92. Along with the fledgling American Automobile Association, the NSL was
the leading exponent of this innovation. See H.R. 3667, 64th Cong. (1915) ("A BILL
To acquire, construct, and maintain a national defense highway; to provide
employment for citizens of the United States, and to physically and mentally educate
them for defense. "); see also Letter from Congressman William D. Stephen to
George Haven Putman (10-CA, Los Angeles) (unpublished material on file with
Columbia University, Manuscripts and Rare Books Library, George Haven Putnam
Papers) (explaining H.R. 3667, that the highway system will be 10,000 miles long and
employ 100,000 citizens in good times and 'several times that number in 'hard times'
and that "the employment of new men periodically, will greatly add to our trained
reserves." ).
Among those convinced was Army Captain Dwight David Eisenhower. In
1919 Eisenhower crossed the country in an Army convoy and saw the need to
improve the interstate highway system. In 1954, "as a part of his overall Cold War
program" President Eisenhower initiated the political maneuvers that eventually
created the system that bears his name-the largest public works project in U.S.
history. STEPHEN AMBROSE, 2 EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 250-251 (1984).
93. The history of conscription is well documented elsewhere. See J. GARRY
CLIFFORD & SAMUEL R. SPENCER, JR., THE FIRST PEACETIME DRAFT (1986);
CHAMBERS, supra note 31. For a list of the NSL pamphlets, see Hearing Before,
supra note 30, at 249-251.
94. WIEBE, supra note 19, at 273.
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other security programs and for considerably greater coordination
between the military services to minimize redundancy. This
cooperation would take place continually and at the highest levels,
much as it does in today's joint Department of Defense.
Besides these defense-oriented proposals, the League called
for a variety of domestic measures designed to ensure that each
American fully supported the state and worked to strengthen its
security. Hart, who believed that universal use of English was
critical to building a strong American nation, proposed a domestic
agenda that would, perhaps unintentionally, also strengthen the
state.
Another service that the League can confer is to stimulate
Americanization by aiding in educating the foreign language
speaking communities which have been formed within our
borders. No public or private schools ought to be allowed to
educate in any racial language except English. Perhaps it will be
necessary to extend this to church services and newspapers in
foreign languages, though here there is the almost insurmountable difficulty that the formal services of the Roman
Catholic Church are in Latin as they have been for ages.
Certainly something can be done to limit the suffrage all over
the country to those who can read and write English, not merely
a few stock phrases and sign their name, but can actually
communicate with people in the ordinary daily life.... Any
adult immigrant who comes to this country and is found three
years thereafter unable to use English for the ordinary
communications of life should be repatriated. 95
The English-only position was popular only as long as war raised
the possibility of subversion. After the peace, it dropped from the
political agenda for over half a century.
By the end of the war, the NSL had publicly proposed and
advocated: a consolidated defense department; national security
coordination by professionals instead of a politically responsive
Congress; joint military purchasing; a national natural resources
board; universal conscription; construction of a national highway
system; and English-only requirements for citizenship and
residency.

95. Letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to Charles D. Orth (Oct. 11, 1919)
(unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart
Papers).
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III. The Fall of the League

November 1918 brought the end of the NSL as a vibrant
institution. With the Armistice, all went quiet on the Western
front. On the home front, the NSL meddled in Congressional
elections, earning the enmity of some powerful players. During the
election campaigns, the League tried to help elect a Congress that
was "100% American." The NSL polled every representative on

his or her votes for certain preparedness measures it considered
touchstones of patriotism. Those who voted "wrong" suffered the
massive directed mailing and mudslinging campaigns of the NSL.
To more cautious observers, most of these votes showed nothing
about a member's patriotism or even his position on preparedness.
Yet to a League blithely shooting from the hip, they were critical
votes. The League attacked dozens of members. The first woman
elected to Congress had dared vote against the declaration of war;
pacifist Jeannette Rankin suffered NSL wrath and lost her seat.96
The NSL's efforts also helped drive New York's Lower East Side

representative, Socialist Meyer London, out of the House; the
League's efforts seemed decisive, as London lost a third term by a
mere 827 votes.' Paradoxically, the League appears to have helped

bring Socialist Victor Berger of Milwaukee to victory by contributing to the defeat of his anti-war opponent. 98 The Democrats
lost control of the House. During the brief lame-duck session,
Speaker Clark appointed a special investigative sub-committee
composed mostly of those deemed less than "100 percent" loyal.
Not surprisingly, this committee took an unfriendly view of the
League's leaders. After weeks of hearings on Capitol Hill and at
the League's New York headquarters, the committee found that the
group had violated the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.' Lacking
96. Rankin was reelected by isolationist Montana in 1940, and she cast the sole
"nay" vote on the decision to declare war in December 1941.
97. See PEARLMAN, supra note 31, at 161.
98. See Hearing Before, supra note 30, at 427. Congress then refused to seat
Berger.
99. In the era before Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of 1925 (FCPA) extended the reach of the Tillman Act of 1907 which
had been part of President Theodore Roosevelt's original program to limit the
influence of corporations on the political process. See Kirk J. Nahra, PoliticalParties
and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56
FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 59 n.35, 60 n.45 (1987) ("As the historical background [of the
Tillman Act] indicates, its aim was not merely to prevent the subversion of the
integrity of the electoral process. Its underlying philosophy was to sustain the active,
alert responsibility of the individual citizens in a democracy for the wise conduct of
government.") (citing United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957)); see also
David Rocklin, Note and Comment, Non-Profit CorporatePoliticalSpeech, 63 CHI.-
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effective leadership and divided by bitter internal disputes over the
Treaty of Paris, the League soon fell into disrepute.
The diminished League focused increasingly on domestic
security measures. In 1920, the League clamored for an even more
repressive and less representative state, proposing to combat
radicals at home though education campaigns designed to "fight
Bolshevism and preach Americanism" and teach 100% Americanism to immigrants and children, "urging universal military training
as a necessity for National Defense and spreading knowledge of its
mental and physical benefits and democratizing influence." ' ° The
NSL also advocated a "National Budget" that centralized all
spending decisions in the hands of experts in Washington. In 1921,
its new president, Charles Orth, opened a campaign to drive
radicals from American colleges and universities. 1 This agenda
went only slightly further than that of a few years before, and yet
with its new strident tone it could well have been drafted by
Mussolini's contemporary American cousin.
After several years of the NSL's drift to the right, a more
centrist group under Menken retook control. The League limped
along for over two decades without serious political impact. At one
point, former assistant secretary of the navy Franklin D. Roosevelt
even served as a vice president, as the League again attempted to
The nation, however, had
focus on bolstering national defense.'
little taste for defense issues. Congress decimated the Army and
reduced the Navy to levels below those allowed by the Washington
Treaty. The national security movement had lost its drive. In 1925
Menken decided to give more attention to his legal practice, turning
over the presidency to Lt. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard, recently
retired commander of the U.S. Second Army. Under Bullard, who
KENT. L. REV. 159, 161 (1987) for more legislative history, including the one test
case of the rule's constitutionality, United States v. U.S. Brewers' Association, 239 F.
163 (W.D. Pa. 1916) (Congress may limit corporate speech in federal elections).
The FCPA, ch. 368, §§ 368 301-19, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (current version
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994)) banned "any kind of contribution by a
corporation in connection with federal elections." Rocklin, supra, at 161.
100. National Security League Flyer (June 1920) (on file with Harvard
University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart Papers); see also the conservative ALB.
EVENING J., Sept. 23, 1923, citing with approbation the League's anti-communist,
anti-labor works.
101. See EDWARDS, supranote 31, at 132.
102. See Minutes of the National Security League Board of Directors (Apr. 2,
1924) (unpublished material on file with Harvard University Library, Albert
Bushnell Hart Papers); see also Letter from S. Stanwood Menken to Albert Bushnell
Hart (Dec. 22, 1924) (on file with Harvard University Library, Albert Bushnell Hart
Papers).
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continued as president until 1942, the organization lacked initiative,
internal political consensus or external support, funds, or influence.
Throughout the twenties and thirties, Bullard spoke and wrote
about the importance of universal military training, the need for a
larger defense budget, and the growing communist threatapparently without effect. In 1930 he had even cast Menken from
the membership rolls because the former president publicly
supported recognition of the Soviet Union. This was too much for
the anti-communist general.
The League went bankrupt in 1939. The general burned most
of its records. After losing its offices in 1940, it survived until 1942
-but only on paper, in Bullard's New York City apartment. On its
last day of operation, Bullard summarized the history of the
League:
Up to the end of the First World War the League's main
purpose had been the National Defense and Preparedness. It
then turned its attention very strongly to the Constitution and
the upkeep of our system of government and anti-communism
which had started in Russia. The third one, communism, began
to play out about four or five years ago when Russia ceased to
be a communism [sic] and became a dictatorship with, however,
a plain tendency toward a great freedom for the people. Then
the League relaxed its efforts against communism. The other
two matters, the National Defense and the Constitution, have
kept up to the present and for the last two and a half years
especially the National Defense. A great deal more could be
added to this but that has been the League's general work
through its life of twenty-six years.103
The League was overtaken by events. Decades later, even Henry
Stimson did not consider it important enough to mention in his
memoirs.' °
Responding to my query in the spring of 1996,
Stimson's amanuensis and friend, McGeorge Bundy, responded:
How sorry I am to have to tell you I draw a blank on the
National Security League.

I don't say I never heard of it,

because I think I did run into its existence somewhere in my
work with Colonel Stimson. But that's literally all I can tell you.
I don't recall discussing it with him, or indeed with anyone else
about it. From this gap I reach the conclusion that neither the
Colonel nor I thought the subject important enough in his life
103. Diary entry of Robert Lee Bullard (Aug. 27, 1942) (unpublished material on
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Robert Lee Bullard Papers).
104. See STIMSON & BUNDY, supra note 75.
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for us to pursue it then, in the late '40s. But I can't tell you
more than that because I don't remember any more.105
The League had established a discourse and an agenda - and then
faded from memory.
IV. National Security After the League
Notoriously isolationist during the 1920's and thirties, the
United States pretty much ignored the national security agenda
which quietly waited for the right moment. When Admiral Isoroko
Yamamoto shattered the myth of American isolation on December
7, 1941, national security moved to the fore in political discussion.
Not long after the end of World War II, the NSL's agenda had
resurfaced as the blueprint for the postwar world.
A. Between the Wars
In the inter-war period, the idea of national security remained
largely dormant. On the one hand, domestic security posed several
pressing political issues, most of which were eventually (if only
temporarily and partially) resolved in favor of a positive notion of
liberty. First, the Red Scare of 1918-1919 allowed J. Edgar Hoover
to reshape the Federal Bureau of Investigation into a national
police force with jurisdiction over so-called subversive
organizations. In one notorious set of raids on January 2, 1920,
federal agents arrested more than 4,000 alleged communists. 1°6 But
Hoover's power diminished with the return to normalcy, and in the
1920's and thirties it fell far short of the high-water mark it would
reach in the fifties."1 7 Likewise, the defense of First Amendment
rights intensified."~ The backlash against loss of liberties during the
war included heightened scrutiny of government efforts to limit free
speech. In fact, in the struggle for unpopular minorities to be
heard, First Amendment rights became an independent and highly
politicized subject of constitutional interpretation, and as such no
longer merely an item on the national security agenda. As Hart

105. Letter from McGeorge Bundy to Mark R. Shulman (April 29, 1996) (on file
with the author).
106. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 60, at 115.
107. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY, 1914-1932,
77-83 (1958) (concluding "the 1920's despite their chauvinism and conservatism,
were hostile to the spirit of the Red Scare.").
108. Foremost among the defenders, Roger Baldwin founded the National Civil
Liberties Bureau (later the American Civil Liberties Union) to safeguard civil rights.
See Richard Gid Powers, Introduction to MOYNIHAN, supra note 60, at 24.
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had noted during the war, a free press is fundamental to democracy
and also severely threatened by war:
One of the triumphs and protections of democratic government
is the liberty of the press. It has been won by sheer
determination in the teeth of the fundamental belief of despotic
governments that it is harmful to them to have people discuss
what is going on .... How is it today? Even in England there is
no such thing as a free press. Among belligerent powers no
criticisms are allowed ....

[In Germany] free thought, public

19
discussion the will of the people have lost their meaning. 0

Fortunately for the cause, the American Civil Liberties Union and
other like-minded organizations arose to champion the fourth
estate in the post-war era.
Between wars, proposals for a unified defense department
occasionally surfaced both inside the government and out-to little
effect. Throughout the twenties, Army Brigadier General William
"Billy" Mitchell ardently advocated a joint "Department of
National Defense" composed of the Navy, the Army, and a new Air
Force. ' ° Mitchell's ideas for changing the military, however, were
too radical for the Army of his day, despite the fact that the
American Legion and the Army War College sponsored similarly
ignored studies."' Outside traditional defense circles, the idea was
heard by few until problems of inter-service rivalry and lack of
cooperation reappeared during the Second World War.
B. The Second World War
In the spring of 1942, Columbia University's long-time
president Nicholas Murray Butler made a similar proposal in his
memoirs and also in a letter to his friend President Franklin
Roosevelt. Referring to his memoirs, he asked the President
to read page 358-9-60 where I discuss the question of a Single
Department

of National

Defense....

All sorts of stories

involving and illustrating this lack of cooperation are in
circulation. Probably not all of them are true, but they do
represent a state of public opinion which is increasingly
important. It appears to be difficult to make some of the
representatives of the army and navy grasp the fact that
109. See HART, supranote 68, at 11, 13-14.
110. See National Defense Miscellaneous (1924-1925) (unpublished material on
file with the Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Box 45, William Mitchell

Papers).
111. See id.
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dominance over both of these forces for defense has, under
present-day conditions, passed to the air force and national
defense must now be administered as a unit and not as two or
even three separate units which may fail in full cooperation with
each other.... I do believe that the plan outlined in the pages
referred to is a sound and convincing one and that now is the
time to put it into effect. To do so, would add one more to your
outstanding achievements
as the Chief Administrator of our
2
people's Government.1
The Butler archives do not include a presidential response. Only a
few months later joint (Army, Navy, Marines, and Army Air Force)
and combined forces (U.S. and British) launched the largest
amphibious operation in modern history. Operation TORCH
signally demonstrated the armed forces' ability to cooperate under
the worst of circumstances to achieve remarkable success. They
quickly established a beachhead in North Africa from which the
Allied forces eventually liberated two continents.
For the
remainder of the war, inter-service cooperation continued on an ad
hoc basis.
C. After the War
In 1945, however, reformers returned to the issues of national
security. Much had changed over the preceding quarter century, in
three important areas. First, military roles and missions were
rethought in light of the gargantous World War II campaigns. The
scope and scale of war had expanded dramatically, as had the
ability to strike across wide expanses of ocean. The German
Blitzkrieg and above all the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had
shattered many Americans' faith in their nation's invulnerability.
The conduct of the war and lessons learned from other armed
forces brought home the critical importance of cooperation among
land, sea, and air forces. This was as true at the tactical level as at
the level of grand strategy. Frequently in the Pacific, tactical
success depended on soldiers fighting alongside marines, with air
support and naval bombardment."3 Likewise, grand strategy
112. Letter from Nicholas Murray Butler to Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 22,
1942) (unpublished material on file with Columbia University, Manuscripts and
Rare Books Library, Nicholas Murray Butler Collection, Presidential
Correspondence Folder) (the letter is referring to ACROSS THE YEARS (1942)).

For more on Butler, see ALBERT
113.

MARRIN, NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

For some of the problems this requirement entailed, see CRAIG

(1976).

CAMERON,
AMERICAN SAMURAI: MYTH, IMAGINATION, AND THE CONDUCT OF BATTLE IN THE
FIRST MARINE DIVISION, 1941-1951 chs. 4, 5 (1994).
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required that General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester
Nimitz not only divide the Pacific theater of operations but also
share forces.
Second, many people in the United States developed a form of
paranoia that saw fifth column enemies everywhere.
Even
paranoiacs can have real enemies; the Soviet Union started to
expand its efforts to subvert the United States at home."' Unlike
the Red Scare of 1919, however, this fear was seriously grounded.
Russia had long since fallen to an internal communist revolution,
and the most populous nation on earth, China, seemed about to
follow suit. Communist expansion had claimed eastern Europe and
now menaced the dominoes of Southeast Asia. This fed fears of a
foreign-inspired internal revolution in the United States.
Third, the emergence of post-war technology meant that for
the first time an enemy could strike the continental United States
catastrophically. The sea-launched surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
had been sufficient to cause the War and Justice departments to
imprison thousands of American citizens based merely on their
ethnic origins. The Supreme Court had approved these extraordinary violations of civil and human rights."5 The German
scientists who designed the V-2 rockets that attacked London in
1945 had been brought home by the Soviets and the Americans to
serve their competing rocket development programs. The firestorm bombings of Dresden and Tokyo, and even the nuclear
explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, barely foreshadowed the
destructiveness of intercontinental missiles to come.
These dramatic changes inevitably altered the ways Americans
looked at defense at home and abroad. The official responses were
initially temporized, driven more by fear and confusion than by a
defined national security agenda. But a coherent policy began to
coalesce in August 1945."6 Secretary of the Navy James V.
Forrestal, dispirited about the possibility of a peaceful post-war

114. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 60 (especially ch. 5).
115. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (finding constitutional the
exclusion and curfew imposed upon individuals of Japanese descent living in the
United States).
116. The initial Congressionally-sponsored efforts produced a couple of reports
and unsuccessful bills, but the detailed history of the 1945-1947 origins of the
National Security Act is found elsewhere. See PAUL Y. HAMMOND, The Unification
Controversy, in ORGANIZING FOR DEFENSE: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISH-

MENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1961); see also Army-Navy Consolidation,in II
EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 239-242 (1945); Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr.,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE GENERAL STAFF (1946); Thomas-Hill-Austin Bill, S.

2044, 79th Cong. (1946).
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world, told a Senate committee, "Our national security can only be
assured on a very broad and comprehensive front.... I am using
the word 'security' here consistently and continuously, rather than
'defense.' ,', Senator Edwin Johnson responded, "I like your
words, 'national security.' ,,1.Forrestal went on to say, "The

question of national security is not merely a question of the Army
and the Navy. We have to take into account our whole potential
for war, our mines, industry, manpower, research and all the

activities that go into normal civilian life."'"9
The next month, Ferdinand Eberstadt sent to Forrestal and
Congress a report advocating the continued existence of individual

military departments with the addition of a new Department of the
Air Force. Coordination would take place within a new institution,
a National Security Council consisting of the President, the three

service secretaries, and the Secretary of State.'2° This new National
Security Council (NSC) would direct foreign and military policy

and supervise the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and
National Security Resources Board (NSRB). An expert Special
Assistant to the President would direct both the NSC and the
NSRB."2 '
117. Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482 Before the Senate Comm. On Military
Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 299, at 108 (1945) (testimony of James Forrestal).
118. Id.
119. Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85
YALE L.J. 401, 410 (1976); see also THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: DOCUMENTS ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION, 1944-1978 (Alice C. Coles et. al. eds.
1978); DEMETRIOS CARALEY, THE POLITICS OF MILITARY UNIFICATION (1966); U.S.
CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR
MILITARY POLICY, PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF ARMED
FORCES, HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POST-WAR MILITARY

POLICY, 78th Cong., 2d Sess, "Robert Lovett Testimony, April 26, 1944," (1944);
FERDINAND EBERSTADT, UNIFICATION OF THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS AND
POSTWAR ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: REPORT TO HON. JAMES

FORRESTAL, SECRETARY OF NAVY (Senate Comm. on Naval Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st
Cong., Comm. Print 1545) [hereinafter EBERSTADT REPORT].
120. See EBERSTADT REPORT, supra note 119; see also TOWNSHEND HOOPES &
DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, DRIVEN PATRIOT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES FORRESTAL

321 (1992).
121. See HOOPES & BRINKLEY, supra note 120, at 321. Forrestal had hopes of
making these councils resemble those created within the British Cabinet; see
ARNOLD ROGOW, JAMES FORRESTAL: A STUDY IN PERSONALITY, POWER, AND
POLICY 266 (1963). For the background on the Eberstadt Report, see JEFFERY M.
DORWART, EBERSTADT AND FORRESTAL (1991). For the text, see the original or the
more accessible reprinted and abridge edition in the appendix of THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL: JACKSON SUBCOMMITTEE PAPERS ON POLICY-MAKING AT THE

PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL (Sen. Henry M. Jackson, ed., 1965). For a cogent discussion of
the particulars of the proposals, see HAMMOND, supra note 116. Koh argues that the
NSC in general and the Special Assistant to the President in particular were
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Forrestal's biographer Jeffery Dorwart notes, "The EberstadtForrestal brand of corporatism stressed leadership by an
organizational elite that mediated between conflicting groups,
generated public consensus, designed policies and managed
national affairs."' 22 Forrestal's reforms consequently institutionalized political ideas from the top down. They ordered complex
ideas and interests into simple chains of command. Moreover, they
shared an nearly paranoid (or prescient) fear for the security of the
nation. Of Forrestal, James F. Byrnes wrote, "He clearly saw...
the menace of communism before his colleagues recognized it.
Frequently he warned of their plans for world domination.' 23
Likewise, General Albert Wedemeyer claimed that Forrestal was
one of the few who "understood the full implications of
communism. ,121
Forrestal also understood the implications for the republic. He
knew that the country now had to weigh security against liberty. At
the beginning of 1948, he wrote the New York Times military
correspondent Hanson W. Baldwin, "It has long been one of my
strongly held beliefs that the word 'security' ought to be stricken
from the language and the word 'risk' substituted.... The great
danger in any country is for people to believe that there is anything
absolute about security.
Air power, atomic power, bombs,
wealth-by itself none of these things can give any security."' 25 In
Baldwin, Forrestal found a kindred spirit who was lecturing
audiences in March 1947 that only utter destruction of all enemies
"can completely solve the problem of security and assure 100
percent national defense in this atomic age., 126 Shortly thereafter,
Forrestal convened the service chiefs at Key West to sort out roles
and missions for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the new Air
Force. As Forrestal's concern grew about the scope of the Soviet
threat, he faced serious manpower problems and concluded that the
originally intended by Congress and used by Truman as mere advisors to the
President. He correctly cautions against reading the strong Nixon, Carter or Reagan
era NSC's as the original model. See KOH, supra note 6, at 54.
Eberstadt, a Princeton contemporary of Forrestal served under Col. Henry L.
Stimson in the 77th Division. See DORWART, supra, at 19. He was gassed at the
Vesle Defense Sector. See id.
122. DORWART, supra note 121, at 7.
123. ROGOW, supra note 121, at 321 (quoting Letter from James F. Byrnes to
Arnold A. Rogow (Mar. 12, 1962)).
124. Id. at 321 (citing ALBERT WEDEMEYER, WEDEMEYER REPORTS! 430 (1958)).
125. Id. at 283.
126. Transcript of Hanson Baldwin Lecture (Mar. 25, 1947) (unpublished
material on file with Yale University, Manuscripts and Archives, Papers of Hanson
Baldwin, Group no.54, series II, "Writings: Addresses, 1940-1967," Box 25).
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only alternative to universal military training was a revival of the
draft.127
In language, policy and spirit, then, Forrestal's program
resembled nothing so closely as the NSL's platform of a generation
earlier. He played a central role in shaping the 1947 National
Security Act which in turn formed the blueprint for the entire U.S.
defense and domestic security posture of the Cold War. And he
adopted the NSL agenda wholesale.
Within two years, Congress had passed and President Truman
had signed into law most of the measures that the NSL had
proposed unsuccessfully a generation before.128 The National
Security Act of 1947 created a unified Department of Defense,
under Forrestal, which included a new service, the Air Force. The
secretary of this combined department would have his own staff of
experts to coordinate every aspect of national defense-research
and development, acquisition and logistics, planning, and even
decisions to deploy forces. The service chiefs-the Army and Air
Force Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the
Marine Corps Commandant-were left with training and tactical
war-fighting. The Act also created a special assistant to the
president for national security affairs129-whose power culminated
in the Kissinger era (1969-1975) when his influence overshadowed
that of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Act established a
National Security Council composed of civilian and military experts
to collect information and generate advice for the President. 3 ° The
council eventually grew so powerful that it could conduct its own
covert military operations abroad in defiance of Congressional
mandates (e.g. during the Iran-Contra affair). The Act established
a centralized intelligence agency.. (the CIA) that would not only
collect and analyze information but also wage paramilitary
operations shielded from the press and even from Congressional
oversight. The first agents arrived in Guatemala 13in2 March 1947 and
helped overthrow the government six years later.
The Act helped to create a national security state that carried
out some of the most drastic of the domestic security measures.
127. See ROGOW, supranote 121, at 286.
128. See National Security Act, ch. 343, Title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 496 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 402 (1994)).
129. See 50 U.S.C. § 402(c).
130. See id. § 402(a).
131. See id. § 403-1.
132. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 60, ch. 7 (especially page 181). Other important
coups or attempted coups were also undertaken outside Congressional oversight: in
Iran and Cuba.
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That same CIA and the FBI collected intelligence on American
citizens. They conducted clandestine operations against American
citizens at home and abroad. Even at a more benign level, this new
strong state created a massive interstate highway system much like
that offered by the NSL half a century before. That network was
named for the army general officer who institutionalized an idea
the NSL had sponsored. Eisenhower was, of course, the first new
president elected after the National Security Act of 1947-a fitting
choice of the man to lead the nation into the new era. The
Department of Defense and the CIA eventually won such large
budgets that they could shape civilian research, development, and
even education in science-at first in rocketry and atomic energy,
but soon in biology, health sciences, non-atomic physics, and
engineering-and then in many of the social sciences, especially
through massive financial support for the fields of Soviet and China
studies and psychology. In short, in the name of national security,
the state intervened in nearly every sector of the productive
economy.
While the National Security League was ahead of its time in its
prescriptions for domestic and international security, the horrors of
the Second World War so dramatically changed the U.S. domestic
political landscape that the nation was ready to adopt most of the
NSL's prescriptions for defense-at home and abroad. The
Jeffersonian tradition in American military policy was dead. The
Neo-Hamiltonian vision of domestic security reshaped the United
States into a national security state, in which the distinction
between war and peacetime had been eroded in the new paradigm
of a Cold War.

